The state owns the pavement. Who owns the cash flow?

Consider the North Tarrant Express, a 13.3-mile managed-lane concession on I-820 and SH 121/183 in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. Asking “Who owns it?” produces seven answers.

1. Physical ownership. The State of Texas owns the highway and right-of-way. The concession company did not buy a strip of Texas real estate. It received contractual rights within a state highway corridor.

2. Statutory control. The Texas Transportation Commission and TxDOT retain public authority over the facility: enforcement of the concession, oversight of safety and standards, approval rights over specified actions, and the ability to exercise contractual remedies. A concession is broad, but it is not sovereignty.

3. Revenue rights. NTE Mobility Partners, LLC is entitled to the managed-lane toll economics through 2061, subject to operating costs, debt service, revenue sharing, contractual restrictions, and handback requirements. That right is the investable asset.

4. Equity ownership. As of Ferrovial’s May 2026 fact book, a Ferrovial/Cintra affiliate held 62.97% and a Meridiam affiliate held 37.03%. Those percentages refer to the concession business, not 62.97% and 37.03% shares of the highway itself.^S6

5. Debt control. At December 2025, NTE reported about $1.60 billion of project debt. Its bond documents restrict distributions if debt-service coverage falls below stated thresholds. Creditors hold liens on project revenues and contractual protections that can outweigh shareholder votes during distress. They can restrict equity distributions without owning the roadway.^S6

6. Operations. The project company is responsible for operating and maintaining the managed lanes. Toll billing is handled through the North Texas Tollway Authority’s collection platform; under the disclosed arrangement, TxDOT remits amounts to the concession project within two to three business days. That shifts much of the tag and collection risk away from the private operator even though traffic risk remains with the project.^S6

7. Residual ownership. When the concession ends, the contractual toll and operating rights expire and the asset remains with the state, subject to the agreement’s handback condition. Equity owns a wasting legal interest. There is no perpetual terminal value after 2061.

Separate debt claims from equity, operating contracts from revenue rights, and private concessions from ownership of public land. A lender can restrict distributions without owning the roadway; a billing agent can collect tolls without owning the proceeds.

Value depends on enforceable rights to charge tolls, set rates, operate, access the corridor, and claim contractual protection—plus the time remaining before those rights expire.

A toll-road model begins with:

Gross toll revenue = traffic volume × average toll paid

Define traffic consistently: transactions, trips, axles, and vehicle miles are different measures. Average tolls vary by trip, time, vehicle, occupancy, tag status, and congestion. Billed revenue also differs from collected cash.

The simplified cash waterfall is:

Billed tolls
  – HOV discounts, exemptions, leakage, and unpaid bills
  – collection and customer-service costs
= collected toll revenue
  – routine operations and maintenance
  – major maintenance and lifecycle capital spending
= cash available before financing
  – interest and scheduled principal
  – required debt-service and maintenance reserves
  – government revenue sharing
  – taxes, where applicable
= cash available for equity distributions

Each deduction has a different driver.

Traffic volume responds to population, employment, trip patterns, freight, fuel prices, remote work, and the quality of free alternatives. A growing metropolitan area can still produce weak toll demand if the corridor is in the wrong place, ramps do not match origins and destinations, or development arrives later than forecast.

Average toll reflects more than posted price. On a fixed schedule, it moves with trip length, vehicle mix, and periodic rate decisions. On a managed lane, software may reprice every few minutes to preserve speed. Drivers buy access and a higher probability of arriving on time.

Collection quality affects both cost and cash recovery. Electronic tags cost less to collect and are more likely to yield payment than mailed invoices. Administrative fees can improve recovery but create political resistance. The DFW concessions are unusual because NTTA handles billing and the project companies receive rapid public remittance. Their margins are not a benchmark for roads bearing their own violation and collection risk.

Operating costs may be modest in a mature electronic system, but pavement, bridges, software, gantries, drainage, and required lane additions create large, uneven capital obligations.

The North Tarrant Express illustrates the distinction. In 2025 it reported $323 million of revenue and $278 million of adjusted EBITDA, an 86.1% margin. LBJ Express reported $244 million and $202 million, an 82.8% margin. NTE 35W reported $368 million and $294 million, a 79.9% margin. Calculated revenue per transaction was about $8.73, $5.30, and $7.08, respectively. These are sponsor-reported adjusted EBITDA figures, not audited cash available for debt service, and they benefit from the collection arrangement.^S6

Debt changes what those margins mean. Reported 2025 net debt was about 5.3 times adjusted EBITDA at NTE, 10.1 times at LBJ, and 5.6 times at NTE 35W. LBJ can therefore have a high operating margin and still be the most financially sensitive of the three. Interest, principal, reserve requirements, and refinancing terms sit between EBITDA and the shareholder.^S6

Revenue sharing limits equity’s upside. The DFW agreements use progressive formulas that can transfer up to 75% of revenue above specified bands to TxDOT. During 2025, disclosed government-sharing amounts included $26.4 million at NTE 35W and $8.1 million at NTE, plus separate sharing of refinancing gains and the LBJ “Wishbone” extension. Strong performance does not flow one-for-one to equity.^S6

Mature roads still require capital. NTE’s mandatory capacity improvement was triggered in 2023. The project disclosed roughly $355 million of works, financed partly with a $414 million private activity bond issue; construction was 67% complete at year-end 2025. An investor valuing the road on current EBITDA without the contractual expansion would overstate equity value.^S6

Pricing power is conditional

The DFW managed lanes reprice as often as every five minutes. For 2026, the disclosed “soft cap” was $1.156 per mile, indexed to CPI-U. Rates can exceed it under mandatory congestion conditions, with the system designed around a 50 mph service target. Heavy vehicles face multipliers. Qualifying high-occupancy vehicles receive discounts that are reimbursed under public arrangements.^S6

Contractual pricing power remains subject to demand:

Revenue = toll price × paid traffic

Higher rates increase revenue only when lost volume is small enough. Managed lanes may raise peak prices to preserve speed; off-peak increases can empty the road. Political tolerance can constrain rates even when contracts permit them.

SH 130 uses a different framework. Its concession ties annual toll escalation to nominal Texas gross state product per capita and does not require reductions when that measure falls. The former SH 288 contract combined dynamic pricing with annual parameters: a minimum increase equal to the greater of 2% or CPI, and a cap equal to the greater of 3% or nominal Texas GSP per capita. These clauses can provide inflation protection, but only if drivers continue to pay.^S13S4

Leverage makes the equity behave like an option

Suppose a concession is worth 100 and carries 70 of debt. Equity is 30. A 10% decline in enterprise value reduces equity to 20, a 33% loss. A 20% increase raises equity to 50, a 67% gain. The road’s physical condition can be unchanged while the equity value moves sharply.

Greenfield projects must service debt before traffic matures. A miss in year three can exhaust liquidity even if demand improves by year fifteen. Public networks can spread ramp-up risk; a stand-alone concession may lack that capacity.

Concession life adds another constraint. A road with 35 years remaining is not equivalent to one with 70 years. Every year that passes removes a year of cash flow. A valuation can include a handback payment only if the contract actually provides one. It cannot append a perpetual terminal value to a right that legally expires.

Why institutions still want the exposure

Pension and infrastructure funds seek long duration, entry barriers, and indexed prices. Insurers and bond investors seek contractual debt service. Banks finance construction and refinancing; distressed funds buy impaired claims and may convert them into equity.

Built corridors with proven traffic, explicit rate formulas, funded maintenance, and long remaining terms reduce uncertainty. Forecast misses, free-road expansion, leverage, rehabilitation costs, political pressure, and termination rights can still impair value.

Governments use concessions to add capacity and transfer risk. A private consortium can supply equity, construction execution, and balance-sheet capacity; it can accept cost, schedule, traffic, and lifecycle risks that a public agency does not want. The structure can advance a road earlier. SH 130’s federal project record says TxDOT estimated the P3 delivered Segments 5–6 about 20 years sooner than conventional funding would have allowed.^S11

NTE and LBJ combined private equity with federal TIFIA loans, tax-advantaged bonds, and public funds. Private equity costs more than public tax-exempt debt. Acceleration, transferred risk, and operating incentives must justify that premium and the contract’s constraints.

Analyze pledged systems before individual highways. NTTA pools network revenue; CTRMA separates its system from MoPac Express; TxDOT’s Central Texas Turnpike System pools SH 130 Segments 1–4, SH 45 North, SH 45 Southeast, and Loop 1. Separate road-level valuations can double-count revenue and miss shared debt.

Public systems are businesses without shareholders

NTTA illustrates the scale of public systems. Its nine-member board has two appointees from each of Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties, plus one gubernatorial appointee. The system includes the Dallas North Tollway, President George Bush Turnpike, Sam Rayburn Tollway, Chisholm Trail Parkway, 360 Tollway, and smaller facilities. In 2025 it recorded 961.0 million transactions, $1.253 billion of toll revenue net of bad debt, $1.105 billion of net revenue available for debt service, and $675.7 million of debt service, for calculated coverage of 1.64 times. Long-term debt was $8.519 billion.^S15S16

Network pledges let mature roads support newer ones, reducing ramp-up risk and potentially improving borrowing terms. They also obscure individual-road returns.

HCTRA is a Harris County enterprise fund governed through Commissioners Court rather than a shareholder board. For the fiscal year ended September 30, 2025, it reported $1.028 billion of toll revenue, $484.9 million of operating income after $115.5 million of depreciation, and $2.759 billion of bond principal. Its reported revenue-bond coverage was 5.10 times. It also transferred $398.6 million out under transportation-law restrictions, showing how public toll cash can finance broader mobility purposes rather than dividends.^S17

CTRMA is an independent regional authority. The governor appoints its chair; Travis and Williamson counties each appoint three board members. Its system includes 183A, 290, 71, 45SW, and 183, while MoPac Express is treated as a non-system facility. In fiscal 2025, consolidated toll revenue was $276.4 million and principal on notes, bonds, and other obligations was about $2.448 billion. The pledged system reported 2.28 times debt-service coverage.^S18

TxDOT also operates toll systems. In fiscal 2025, the Central Texas Turnpike System reported $337.6 million of operating revenue and $160.3 million of debt service. The Grand Parkway System reported $393.3 million and $175.4 million, respectively. I-35E managed lanes and SH 249 are separately financed state projects. Other TxDOT toll lanes, including portions of the DFW Connector, I-30, LBJ East, and Midtown Express, were reported as non-financed projects.^S21

Fort Bend County’s two public authorities use different debt pledges. FBCTRA had $68.5 million of fiscal 2025 toll revenue and $526.9 million of outstanding bond principal; its capital structure includes revenue debt and tax-supported obligations. The separate Grand Parkway authority reported $45.8 million of toll revenue and $160.0 million of principal, using state right-of-way under a right-of-use arrangement.^S19S20

Public ownership does not establish taxpayer recourse. NTTA relies on system revenue. HCTRA has toll-backed senior liens and legacy tax-supported bonds. Fort Bend has used tax support; Grand Parkway has distinct revenue pledges and support mechanisms. Read each issue’s bond documents.

Removing a road from a pledged network may require release tests, consent, or debt defeasance. Its revenue may already support other facilities. A sale therefore requires more than agreement on the road’s price.

SH 130 Segments 5–6 survived the loss of its original equity.

TxDOT signed the concession agreement in March 2007. The 41-mile southern extension opened in October 2012, with service beginning in November, under a 50-year design-build-finance-operate-maintain concession. Texas retained title. The concession company received toll rights, shared specified revenue with TxDOT, and assumed the project’s operating and financing obligations.^S10S11

The original project cost was $1.328 billion. Funding included $685.8 million of senior bank loans, a $430 million TIFIA loan, $209.8 million of private equity, and $2.3 million of interest income. Cintra held 65% of the original venture and Zachry 35%. The federal loan was subordinate to the senior banks but senior to equity. That priority determined recoveries.^S11S12

The investment thesis looked straightforward. I-35 between Austin and San Antonio was congested. SH 130 offered an 85 mph bypass, freight capacity, and a growing regional economy. Corridor congestion, however, does not establish paid demand on a particular alignment.

Federal reviews found toll revenue more than 60% below original forecasts in the early operating period. Many drivers and truckers stayed on free I-35. The project exhausted its liquidity facility, negotiated payment relief, and entered Chapter 11 in March 2016.^S12

The records establish the forecast miss without proving a single cause. Alignment and ramp placement can weaken time savings; truckers weigh tolls against fuel and schedule reliability. Development can arrive after debt service begins. Congestion on a free route alone does not establish demand for a paid bypass.

The financing left little room for a slow ramp-up. A Kentucky Public Pensions Authority investment memorandum later described the failure as a combination of optimistic traffic, excessive leverage, and an adverse interest-rate swap, with construction defects adding cost and litigation. Those are secondary investment-review statements, but they match the capital structure’s vulnerability.^S13

During bankruptcy, drivers continued using the road and TxDOT retained title. The concession company’s ownership and financial claims changed.

Strategic Value Partners had bought debt from European banks at a discount. The confirmed reorganization became effective on June 28, 2017. The original Cintra and Zachry equity was eliminated. U.S. DOT states that it received subordinated debt and equity interests in the reorganized borrower. The investment report’s 2Q 2024 diligence attributes approximately 65% to SVP-controlled vehicles, 32% to U.S. DOT / Build America, and 4% to other holders; the rounded figures sum to 101%.^S11S13

The federal government received equity and subordinated debt through restructuring. Its equity was a creditor recovery, not shorthand for an unpaid loan. Public sources did not fully disclose its holding vehicle, voting rights, distribution priority, or transfer restrictions; the dated estimate cannot establish those terms.

The reorganized company emerged with $260 million of new financing, according to its current corporate history, and says it has invested more than $160 million in roadway improvements. It reported 14.4 million transactions in 2025, traffic growth of 86% since 2019, and heavy-truck growth of nearly 130%. The 2024 pension memorandum said revenue and EBITDA roughly doubled from 2019 to 2023, with an EBITDA margin near 83% and free-cash-flow conversion around 89% to 91%. Much of the recent financial detail comes from the company or an investment sponsor, rather than audited public statements.^S13S14

A lower acquisition basis and reset capital structure can improve later investors’ prospects without vindicating the original equity. A 2024 continuation-vehicle proposal sought $1.45 billion to extend SVP’s holding period. It describes a possible secondary route, not a completed 2026 sale or verified valuation.^S13

A future acquisition would be an equity purchase in the concession company, subject to TxDOT and financing consents. The federal minority stake complicates negotiations. A proposed 20-year concession extension mentioned in the pension memorandum is upside only if Texas grants it; it cannot be capitalized as though already contractual. Current project debt and audited cash available for debt service were not located. Those omissions matter more to valuation than the road’s recent traffic headline.

SH 288 followed a different path. Traffic and operating margins were strong enough to attract a major brownfield investor, but the government exercised an option that ended the private equity story.

TxDOT executed the comprehensive development agreement in March 2016 with Blueridge Transportation Group. The project added four managed lanes over 10.3 miles, rebuilt major interchange components, and placed operation and maintenance obligations on the concessionaire. Substantial completion occurred in November 2020. The contractual term ran to March 2068.^S1S3

The reported project cost was $1.0635 billion. Financing included $298.6 million of private activity bonds, a $357.0 million TIFIA loan, $14.9 million of capitalized TIFIA interest, $17.1 million of public funds for the Texas Medical Center connection, and $375.3 million of developer and third-party equity. Original participants included ACS Infrastructure, InfraRed, Shikun & Binui, Northleaf, Clal, and Star America.^S3

By late 2023 the cap table had consolidated. Abertis acquired 56.76% for about $1.53 billion; ACS retained 43.24% through ACS SH288 Holdings, LLC. The acquisition presentation reported 2023 pro forma revenue of $90 million, adjusted EBITDA of $66 million, and gross debt of $654 million at December 31, 2022. The lanes used dynamic pricing, with contractual annual parameters tied to CPI and Texas nominal GSP per capita.^S4

Section 31 gave the state a termination-for-convenience right. In July 2024 the Texas Transportation Commission determined that exercising the right was in TxDOT’s interest. The concession ended on October 8. Control reverted to TxDOT, and the Texas Transportation Finance Corporation was authorized to develop and operate the project. The state funded the $1.7317 billion payment through a State Highway Fund loan, later refinanced with roughly $1.7 billion of TTFC toll-revenue and refunding bonds.^S1S2S22

The federal project record specifies the waterfall: termination proceeds first repaid all outstanding debt, including TIFIA, and the balance was available to shareholders. The TIFIA loan was repaid in full on the termination date. Abertis reported receiving $642.365 million and recording a €775.857 million pre-tax loss, or €581.892 million after tax.^S3S5

Each valuation comparison has limits.

Implied equity value at Abertis entry: $1.53 billion divided by 56.76% equals approximately $2.70 billion for 100% of the equity. Adding the separately reported $654 million of gross debt produces an indicative enterprise value of $3.35 billion. This mixes a late-2023 transaction price with debt measured at year-end 2022, so it is a rough inference, not a closing balance sheet. Termination payment multiples: $1.7317 billion equals 19.2 times 2023 pro forma revenue and 26.2 times adjusted EBITDA. Those are gross transaction multiples because the payment covered debt and equity; they are not equity multiples. Estimated gross equity pool: subtracting approximately $650 million of debt from the payment leaves about $1.08 billion before fees, reserves, hedges, working-capital adjustments, and other claims. The actual shareholder distributions need the closing statement. Value per remaining concession year: the payment divided by approximately 43.4 remaining years is $39.9 million per year. This is descriptive, not a valuation method; early cash flow is worth more than late cash flow. Payment versus original equity: the state’s gross payment was about 4.6 times* the original $375.3 million equity contribution. That does not mean the original sponsors earned 4.6 times. Debt was repaid first, ownership changed, capital may have been added or distributed, and the money was invested over years.

Abertis’s loss reflects its entry price relative to the termination payment. Lenders recovered under the waterfall; earlier sellers may have realized gains; Texas acquired decades of revenue and rate control. Returns must be measured for a specified stakeholder and holding period.

For fiscal 2025, TxDOT reported $107.35 million of SH 288 operating revenue, $11.36 million of operating expense, and $2.73 million of maintenance expense, excluding the later bond refinancing treatment. TxDOT has said public control should permit lower tolls and slower escalation than under the former concession. HCTRA supports billing and account functions; TTFC holds the public operating and revenue mandate.^S21S22

SH 288’s buyout cannot price NTE, LBJ, NTE 35W, or SH 130. Their termination language, toll rules, debt, remaining lives, and obligations differ. SH 130 also has a federal equity holder. Any comparison requires the relevant concession agreement and compensation provisions.

Tax-exempt bonds, network pledges, indefinite life, and no private-equity return requirement can lower public financing costs. A mature system can support a new segment through its traffic ramp-up.

Pooling can conceal weak projects, let surplus migrate to broader programs, and delay rate increases through political decisions. Affordable network financing does not establish a new road’s stand-alone value.

Private equity has an entry price, fixed term, distribution tests, and a measurable loss if traffic fails. Contracts can enforce construction, maintenance, and operating duties.

Private ownership alone does not establish operating efficiency. DFW concessions benefit from public collection support, federal credit, and tax-advantaged bonds. Equity returns, contract monitoring, refinancing sharing, and termination provisions add costs. High EBITDA margins can reflect transferred collection risk.

Compare alternatives that deliver the same road, at the same time, with equivalent lifecycle obligations. Public delivery may be cheaper where financing and capacity exist. A constrained agency may rationally pay for construction, schedule, or demand risk transfer.

A toll road combines several asset characteristics. It resembles real estate because location is permanent. It resembles a utility because substitutes are limited and prices may be indexed. It resembles a bond because cash flows can be long-dated and debt-heavy. It remains an operating business because demand, service quality, incidents, billing, maintenance, and political relations determine the residual. A finite concession term limits each analogy.

Texas has favorable population trends. The Census Bureau estimated 31.71 million residents on July 1, 2025, up 8.8% from the April 2020 base. Dallas–Fort Worth reached roughly 8.5 million, up about 11% over that period, with substantial growth in outer counties. Houston and DFW posted some of the country’s largest one-year metropolitan population gains in 2023–24.^S23

The state’s activity centers are dispersed. Jobs, homes, airports, warehouses, ports, and industrial sites are separated by long road trips. Transit is limited for many suburb-to-suburb routes. Texas also carries substantial freight: the state freight plan reported roughly 4 billion tons in 2019 and projects more than 8 billion by 2050. Congestion data show that most of Texas’s worst bottlenecks remain concentrated in the four largest metropolitan areas.^S24S25

These conditions favor toll options but cannot rescue a badly placed road.

Value depends on trips: origins, destinations, bottlenecks, ramps, and minutes saved. A driver may pay $12 for reliability before a flight yet refuse $3 on a quiet weekend. Freight demand requires routes and toll costs that fit the shipper’s economics.

Free-road capacity is the clearest substitute. Widening a parallel highway can reduce toll demand, though construction disruption can temporarily increase it. Contractual protection against competing facilities is never absolute; governments preserve rights to improve their networks. SH 130’s agreement, for example, contained a competing-facilities zone but excluded I-35 and projects already in regional plans.^S12

Remote work changes commute frequency and peak timing. Fuel prices increase bypass costs. Development generates traffic only after occupancy and road connections; freight growth helps only where vehicle rules and logistics routes fit.

Investment access, entry price, and the security’s rights matter as much as the corridor. A valuable road can offer no available equity or only a bond with limited upside.

Table 2 compares the contracts and capital structures of the five principal concessions.

NTE offers a seasoned corridor, strong reported cash flow, and about 35 years of term. Cumulative project distributions through 2025 were about $1.172 billion, 2.75 times original project equity before considering timing, additional capital, taxes, or residual value. The mandatory-capacity program and government sharing reduce free upside. A buyer would most plausibly enter through a sale by Meridiam, a sponsor-level transaction, or project bonds; Ferrovial’s listed shares provide diluted exposure across a much larger portfolio.^S6

LBJ has an attractive urban bottleneck and 2025 adjusted EBITDA of $202 million, but its roughly 10.1 times net-debt-to-EBITDA ratio leaves less room for error. Cumulative distributions of $952 million exceeded original equity in nominal dollars, yet that statistic says little about today’s entry price. APG- or Meridiam-managed interests could theoretically trade in the secondary market. At the cutoff, no reviewed evidence showed them offered for sale.^S6

NTE 35W produced the highest 2025 revenue of the three DFW concessions, $368 million, and has benefited from staged expansion. It also paid the largest disclosed 2025 revenue share. Its acquisition routes resemble LBJ’s: sponsor stakes, infrastructure-fund or pension secondaries, project bonds, or a recapitalization. The main valuation question is how much growth remains after sharing and future corridor obligations.^S6

SH 130 is the more specialized opportunity. It has become a freight and reliability asset after a failed greenfield ramp-up. SVP’s continuation-vehicle process shows that institutional secondary capital can access it, but the exact 2026 debt, distributions, and cap table are not public. The U.S. government’s minority interest and any TxDOT transfer consent narrow the buyer universe. Upside comes from traffic, freight, adjacent development, and a possible extension; downside comes from repeating the original mistake by capitalizing those possibilities before they are contractual or realized.

SH 288 no longer offers concession equity. A financial investor can consider TTFC toll-revenue bonds, service contracts, or indirect exposure through firms operating for the state. These provide debt or service income. A bondholder receives contracted debt service, not the residual toll upside that Abertis expected.

Public systems mainly offer municipal debt with different pledges, tax support, coverage, and maturities. TIFIA is a federal lending program. Distressed exposure requires a purchasable project claim and enforceable restructuring rights.

A proven concession with 35 years left can disappoint at a 4% equity yield and become attractive after deleveraging. Public efficiency does not give bondholders residual upside. Assess the available security’s price against traffic, debt, maintenance, contractual, and political risks.

Texas usually owns the pavement beneath its major toll concessions. Title alone does not identify who receives tolls or bears losses.

Tolls fund operations, contractors, reserves, debt, and public revenue sharing before equity distributions. Creditors may become shareholders in distress. A termination can repay lenders while impairing equity; expiry ends the private revenue claim.

SH 130 remained open when its original equity was destroyed. SH 288 cost Texas $1.7 billion to reclaim even though Texas already held title. These outcomes follow from separating physical ownership, statutory authority, revenue rights, debt control, operations, and residual ownership.

Ownership figures that remain uncertain

• SH 130 exact current cap table: the supplied report’s 2Q 2024 diligence estimates approximately 65% SVP-controlled vehicles, 32% U.S. DOT / Build America, and 4% other holders; rounding produces 101%. Current company material reconfirms only an SVP-controlled majority and federal minority. Publish the dated estimate only with that rounding and uncertainty.
• SH 130 legal holding vehicles and governance: the public record reviewed does not identify the exact federal equity vehicle, class of equity, voting provisions, distribution preferences, or transfer rights. The federal Build America page confirms both subordinated debt and equity.
• DFW direct legal holder names: Ferrovial’s 2026 filing confirms current economic percentages. Exact intermediate legal names for the Meridiam and APG interests were not established from a current shareholder register. Use “affiliate” unless a TxDOT consent record or project cap table is obtained.
• APG ultimate beneficiary: APG manages pension capital, but the specific pension client behind each project interest was not confirmed. Do not automatically label the stake as ABP-owned.
• Current SH 130 operating subcontractor: SH 130 Concession Company is contractually responsible. Louis Berger Services was identified after restructuring in the 2024 pension material, but a current 2026 subcontractor appointment was not confirmed.

Financial figures not located

• Current SH 130 audited revenue, EBITDA, cash available for debt service, reserve balances, debt principal, interest rate, and maturity schedule.
• A complete SH 288 termination closing statement showing debt payoff by class, swap or hedge closeouts, fees, reserves released, and distributions to every shareholder.
• Cumulative invested capital and distributions for each original and later SH 288 sponsor, which are needed to calculate stakeholder-level returns.
• Stand-alone revenue, maintenance, and debt allocation for every individual road inside NTTA, HCTRA, CTRMA, CTTS, and Grand Parkway system pledges.
• Current market prices and trading yields for each project bond. Those change daily and should be refreshed immediately before publication if the article discusses security-level returns.

Documents unavailable or not fully retrievable

• The SH 130 Chapter 11 confirmed plan, disclosure statement, and equity-allocation exhibits were listed through the claims agent but were not directly retrievable in the research session. The federal financing record and public pension memorandum were used to establish the restructuring outcome.
• Current private shareholder registers, transfer notices, and TxDOT consent documents for the DFW projects and SH 130 were not publicly located.
• A fully parsed final official statement for the late-2025 TTFC SH 288 toll-revenue/refunding bonds should be added before publishing detailed debt-service projections.

Calculations based on inference

• SH 288’s approximately $2.70 billion implied 100% equity value and $3.35 billion indicative enterprise value at Abertis entry.
• SH 288 termination multiples of 19.2x revenue and 26.2x adjusted EBITDA.
• SH 288 estimated $1.08 billion gross equity pool after subtracting approximately $650 million of debt, before all closing adjustments.
• SH 288 payment of approximately $39.9 million per remaining concession year and 4.6x original project equity. Neither is a return metric.
• DFW revenue per transaction, operating margins, net debt/adjusted EBITDA, and cumulative distributions divided by original equity.
• Approximate remaining concession lives at the July 11, 2026 cutoff.

Facts suited to a Texas Public Information Act request

• Current certified cap tables, direct legal shareholders, and all TxDOT-approved ownership transfers for NTE, LBJ, NTE 35W, and SH 130.
• SH 130’s current annual financial statements, debt schedule, TxDOT revenue-share payments, O&M subcontract, and documents defining the U.S. DOT equity interest.
• SH 288’s termination-value calculation, final sources-and-uses statement, payment waterfall, equity distributions, and any settlement or release agreements.
• TTFC’s current SH 288 traffic, toll-rate, operating, maintenance, reserve, and debt-service model.
• Project-level revenue-share and refinancing-gain calculations for the DFW concessions, including the contractual revenue bands used in 2025.
• Release tests and consent requirements that would apply if a road were removed from a public system pledge or concessioned.